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The Ekert 91 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol appears to be secure whatever devices
legitimate users adopt for the protocol, as long as the devices give a result that violates Bell’s
inequality. However, this is not the case if they ignore non-detection events because Eve can make
use of the detection-loophole, as Larrson showed. We show that even when legitimate users take
into account non-detection events Eve can successfully eavesdrop if the QKD system has been
appropriately designed by the manufacturer. A loophole utilized here is that of ‘free-choice’ (or ‘real
randomness’). Local QKD devices with pseudo-random sequence generator installed in them can
apparently violate Bell’s inequality. PACS: 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Dd
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3] is one of the
most promising protocols in quantum information pro-
cessing [4]. Besides the Bennett-Brassard 84 QKD pro-
tocol [1, 3], the interesting Ekert 91 (E91) protocol [2, 3]
makes use of the nonlocality of the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen pairs of quantum bits (qubits) [5].
As is well known, even local realistic models can violate
the Bell’s inequality [5, 6] if two remote experimenters,
Alice and Bob, simply do not take into account non-
detection events in their processing of the experimental
data. This has been termed the detection-loophole (e.g.
[5, 7, 8] and references therein. A discussion on the se-
curity of the Bennett-Brassard 84 protocol in connection
with non-detection events has recently been given [9].).
An issue in QKD is whether legitimate users (also Al-
ice and Bob) can trust a QKD system when they do not
necessarily trust the manufacturer of the system [10, 11].
Of course, this is not a problem if Alice and Bob use only
QKD systems that they have made themselves. However,
this is often impractical. If Alice and Bob conclude that
the QKD system provided by a manufacturer cannot be
trusted, the next problem is to determine how they can
test the QKD system as simply as possible. A basic in-
gredient for security of the E91 protocol is the principle
that an eavesdropper (Eve) cannot emulate true entan-
gled pairs of qubits by any local means, or more specif-
ically that Eve cannot violate Bell’s inequality by any
separable states. One may think that this principle will
hold whatever detectors are used by Alice and Bob, in-
cluding those provided by the manufacturer, as long as
the detectors give a result that violates Bell’s inequality.
If this is the case, then the E91 protocol has an important
advantage over other QKD protocols: Alice and Bob do
not have to test detectors carefully. However, the princi-
ple can be violated apparently by a detection-loophole if
non-detection events are not taken into account, as said
above. Indeed, as shown by Larsson [10], Eve can utilize
the detection-loophole in eavesdropping: A manufacturer
who is a friend of Eve designs a QKD system such that
non-detection events are ignored. If Alice and Bob use
the system provided by the manufacturer, then Eve can
violate Bell’s inequality apparently. In this case, how-
ever, if Alice and Bob do not ignore non-detection events
then Eve can still be caught.
In this paper we strengthen the result of Ref. [10].
If the manufacturer modifies the QKD system appropri-
ately, Eve can successfully eavesdrop even when Alice and
Bob take into account non-detection events. A loophole
utilized here is that of ‘free-choice’ or ‘real randomness’
(e.g. [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]).
This paper is organized as follows. We introduce the
E91 protocol, briefly describe Larsson’s work, introduce
the loophole of free-choice and then show how the pseudo-
random sequence can be utilized by Eve to violate Bell’s
inequality by local means. Finally, we briefly discuss a
debate on Bell’s inequality violation [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]
and conclude.
In the E91 protocol, first Alice and Bob distribute n
pairs of qubits in a Bell state |Ψ−〉 = (1/√2)(|0〉A|1〉B −
|1〉A|0〉B). Here n is a positive integer, |0〉 and |1〉 are nor-
malized and orthogonal states, and A and B denote Alice
and Bob. (The protocol here is a modified version of the
original E91 protocol with the essence unchanged.) For
each instance i = 1, 2, ...n, each user randomly and inde-
pendently chooses to perform either normal measurement
or checking measurement. Later, the only cases used are
those where Alice and Bob’s measurements match, while
the other cases are discarded. Among the matched cases,
those where both Alice and Bob choose a normal mea-
surement is the normal phase, while the other case is the
checking phase. In normal the phase, each user performs
S(z) measurements with a set of basis {|0〉, |1〉}. The out-
comes of Sz measurements are perfectly correlated and
thus used as a key later. In the checking phase, each user
performs those measurements suitable for Bell’s inequal-
ity violation of the state |Ψ−〉: Alice (Bob) randomly
and independently chooses one between the two direc-
tions a and a′ (b and b′) for measurements. Then Alice
(Bob) performs spin-measurements in the chosen direc-
tion. Spin-measurement in direction p (q) is denoted as
S(p) (S(q)) where p = a, a′ (q = b, b′). The probabil-
ity that Alice gets a result ±1 in spin-measurement S(p)
and Bob gets a result ±1 in spin-measurement S(q) is
denoted as P±±(p, q). The correlation function E(p, q) is
given by E(p, q) = P++(p, q) + P−−(p, q) − P+−(p, q) −
P−+(p, q). Bell’s inequality [4, 5, 6] is then given by
|E(a, b) + E(a, b′) + E(a′, b) − E(a′, b′)| < 2. Here the
four directions, a, a′, b, and b′, are chosen such that Bell’s
2inequality is violated for the state |Ψ−〉.
The idea of the E91 protocol can be summarized as
follows. If Eve provides separable states to Alice and
Bob, then Eve can get information on the key. However,
in this case the separable states cannot violate Bell’s in-
equality in the checking phase. Thus Eve is detected. For
example, let us assume that Eve provides either |0〉|1〉 or
|1〉|0〉 with equal probability after recording which state
she sends at each instance. In the normal phase noth-
ing unexpected happens here. In the checking phase,
however, the samples cannot violate Bell’s inequality and
thus the attack by Eve is detected. On the contrary, if
Eve provides the legitimate Bell state then Eve can pass
the checking phase. However, in this case Eve has no
information on the key generated at Alice’s and Bob’s
sites. If Eve provides a partially entangled state, then
she will get partial information on the key.
Let us consider Larrson’s point [10]. Classical infor-
mation can be encoded on the timing of pulses carry-
ing qubits. The manufacturer designs the QKD system
such that the system can read out and make use of the
classical information thus encoded. Here apparently the
system works normally for Alice and Bob. Assume that
a hidden variable λ is encoded in the classical informa-
tion part and that the system is programmed such that it
violates Bell’s inequality by making use of the detection-
loophole. Then Alice and Bob will observe the system
violating Bell’s inequality in the checking phase. Thus
Eve is not detected.
However, we now describe another interesting case,
termed ’the free-choice loophole’ [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]: The
existence of real randomness is a necessary condition to
derive Bell’s inequality. First, let us recall the locality
condition for Bell’s inequality. Let SA(p) (SB(q)) be an
outcome of spin-measurement in p (q) direction at Alice’s
(Bob’s) site. Then a potential candidate is
SA(p) = f(p, q, λ), SB(q) = g(p, q, λ), (1)
where f and g are normal functions. In Eq. (1), the pos-
sibility that measurement outcomes at one site depend on
those at the other site is not excluded. The reason why
the model in Eq. (1) is usually excluded is that if two
events are space-like separated, then Alice’s device has
no way of obtaining information on the choice of Bob’s
device on spin-measurement direction y at the instance
when the spin-measurement is performed, and vice versa.
Therefore, the measurement outcomes of Alice (Bob) do
not depend on those of Bob (Alice). That is, Eq. (1)
reduces to
SA(p) = f(p, λ), SB(q) = g(q, λ), (2)
which is the locality condition. However, there is an im-
portant tacit assumption in the reduction from Eq. (1)
to Eq. (2) [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]: The choice of Bob’s de-
vice on spin-measurement direction q is random so that
Alice’s device cannot predict which one Bob’s device will
choose at a certain instance, and vice versa. Otherwise,
even if the two measurement events are space-like sepa-
rated, Alice’s device can calculate which direction Bob’s
device will choose, and vice versa. Thus, effectively, Al-
ice’s (Bob’s) device has information on which direction
Bob’s (Alice’s) device chooses at the instance when they
are performing the measurement. Hence in this case the
reduction is not valid in general.
Let us now see how Eve can utilize the free-choice
loophole in the E91 protocol: The manufacturer de-
signs a QKD system such that each device chooses spin-
measurement directions according to a pseudo-random
sequence that is installed in the device beforehand. Here
the pseudo-random sequences in the two devices are in-
dependent. The pseudo-random sequence is one that ap-
pears to be random but actually is not. For example, the
sequence 9869604401089... is apparently random but it
is obtained from pi2. The QKD system is also designed
such that one device contains an algorithm for gener-
ating the pseudo-random sequence of the other device.
Thus, effectively, one device has information about the
choices on spin-measurement direction of the other de-
vice. Therefore, the locality condition in Eq. (2) can be
effectively violated in the QKD system provided by the
manufacturer. In this case, users, after careful inspec-
tions, will become aware of a problem in the devices and
that the measurement choices claimed to be random are
not really random, of course. However, it is impractical
for many users to perform such a careful inspection, and
moreover it is a very difficult task to identify a pseudo-
random sequence. In other respects, the design of the
devices is in line with that of Larrson’s: In that the hid-
den variable λ is encoded on the timing of the pulses
carrying qubits. The devices can read out and make use
of the classical information thus encoded. Therefore, Eve
can successfully eavesdrop by adopting an effectively non-
local hidden variable model that simulates the Bell state
|Ψ−〉. Note that here we are dealing with an effectively
non-local hidden variable model that can simulate any
entangled state.
Now, let us briefly discuss a debate on Bell’s inequality
violation [12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. It is clear that the above
QKD devices that are intrinsically local can show non-
local behaviors apparently and effectively. This kinds of
‘local-but-apparently-nonlocal’ models have already been
discussed by several authors, e.g. Bell [12] and Kwiat et
al [13]. Recently, Hess and Philipp claimed to present
a local model that violates Bell’s inequality [14, 15, 16].
However, their model is in the same as the ‘local-but-
apparently-nonlocal’ models. It is a fact that purely local
(deterministic) models without any randomness feeded
outside can violate Bell’s inequality. However, a big
problem is whether the applicable scope of the ‘local-but-
apparently-nonlocal’ models can be extended to macro-
scopic beings that can generate randomness, e.g. hu-
mans. This rather philosophical question is beyond scope
of this paper.
In conclusion, at first glance the E91 protocol can be
secure even if Alice and Bob use any QKD system, as
3long as the system gives a result that violates Bell’s in-
equality. However, as shown by Larrson, this is not the
case if they ignore non-detection events because Eve can
use detection-loophole. We showed that Eve can suc-
cessfully eavesdrop, even when Alice and Bob take into
account non-detection events, if the manufacturer has de-
signed the QKD system appropriately. A loophole uti-
lized here is that of free-choice. We showed how a local
QKD devices with a pseudo-random sequence generator
installed in them can apparently violate Bell’s inequality.
We briefly discussed a debate on Bell’s inequality viola-
tion that is involved with a question on randomness.
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